Productivity, R&d, and Basic Research at the Firm Level in the 1970s by Zvi Griliches
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
PRODUCTIVITY,R&D, AND BASIC RESEARCH
ATTHE FIRM LEVEL IN THE 1970s
ZviGriliches
Working Paper No. 154T




The research reported here is part of -the NBER's research program
in Productivity and project in Productivity and Industrial change
in the World Econon. Any opinions expressed are those of the
author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #1547
January 1985
Productivity, R&D, and Basic Research
at the Firm Level in the 1970s
ABSTRACT
A new data et (the NSF—Census match) containing information on the
R&D expenditures, sales, employment, and other detail for approximately
1,000 largest manufacturing firms in the U.S. during 1957—1977 is
analyzed using a standard production function framework augmented by the
addition of an R&D "capital" and "mix" variables (basic as a fraction of
total and privately financed as a fraction of total). The results indicate
that R&D continued to contribute to productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing
also in the 1970's, with no significant decline in its effectiveness as com-
pared to the 1960's; that the contribution of the basic research component of
such expenditures was significantly higher than its nominal ratio would imply;
and that while federally financed R&D expenditures did have a positive effect
on measured productivity growth of these firms, this effect was significantly
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This paper reports new results on the relationship of R&D expenditures,
especially expenditures on basic research, to productivity growth in U.S.
manufacturing firms during the 1970's. It is based on a new and unique data
set, the NSF R&D—Census match, containing information on R&D expenditures,
sales, employment, and other detail for approximately 1000 largest manufac-
turing firms from 1957 through 1977. It updates the earlier work of Griliches
(1980) on the precursor of this data set, replicates some of Mansfield's (1980)
work on the contribution of basic research to productivity growth using a
larger, more recent, and more representative sample of firms, and complements
similar work by Griliches and Mairesse (1983, 1984) based on a publicly acces-
sible but more limited data set.
Two topics are explored in some detail:(1) Is there any evidence of a
decline in the returns to industrial R&D expenditures, a decline in their
"fecundity" in the 1970's as compared to earlier time periods? And, (2) is
there evidence that basic research is a relatively more important component of
R&D and that there may have been an underinvestment in this component?
A few background facts are worth stressing at this point. In the U.S.
total R&D expenditures in industry peaked (in real terms) around 1968, dropped—2—
slightly in the early 1970's and recovered somewhat in the late 1970's. Relative
to total sales, R&D expenditures in industry declined from 4.2 percent in 1968
to a trough of 2.6 percent in 1979 and then recovered to 3.7 percent by 1982.
This pattern masks a strong divergence between the trends in federally and pri-
vately supported industrial R&D. Federally supported R&D fell from 2.1 percent of
manufacturing sales in 1967 to 0.7 percent in 1979 and has only recently begun
to recover, while company financed R&D stayed essentially constant (relative
to industry sales) with almost all of the fluctuation coming from the decline
in federal support (NSF 1984). During the same period, the economy experienced
one of the sharpest and prolonged recessions of the post—war period. The
recession of 1974—75 was triggered by the first OPEC increase in energy prices
and resulted both in a large and pervasive productivity slowdown and large
amounts of unanticipated inflation. Most hard hit were the primary metals,
motor vehicles, and other heavy, energy related industries. On the whole,
these were the less R&D intensive industries, resulting in a probably spurious
relationship between R&D intensiveness and the productivity slowdown. (See
Criliches 1980 and Griliches—Lichtenberg 1984 for more discussion of these
issues.)
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First I describe the
data set with its advantages and limitations and present some overall compara-
tive statistics. Second, I outline briefly the framework that underlies the
computations to be performed. The results are presented and discussed next
and the paper closes with some caveats and suggestions for further research.—3—
II. The Data
The current project is an extension of work originally begun in the mid
1960s. That work was based on the matching of R&D data collected on behalf
of the NSF by the Bureau of the Census during 1957—1965 with additional com-
pany data from the 1958 and 1963 Census of Manufactures and Enterprise Statis-
tics. The universe consisted of large (1000 or more employees) R&D performing
U.S. manufacturing companies. The final sample of 883 of such companies
accounted for over 90 percent of total sales and R&D expenditures of all firms
in this universe. Because of the confidentiality of the individual data, the
final output was in the form of matrices of correlation coefficients and
standard deviations, broken down into six rather broad industrial groupings,
with no access by us to the actual individual observations.
The main finding of that work (Griliches, 1980) was a rather consistent
and positive relationship between various measures of company productivity
and its investments in research and development. Cobb—Douglas type production
functions, estimated on both levels (1963) and rates of growth (1957—65)
yielded an elasticity of output with respect to R&D investments of about 27
percent (as of 1963), a significantly lower rate of return to federally financed
R&D expenditures, and no clear evidence of significant scale effects either in
R&D investment policies or the returns from it.
In trying to extend the earlier study to the more recent time period
It became clear that the earlier work could not be simply updated, since the
earlier project tapes has been blanked inadvertently in the interim. Also, it
turned out that the 1958 and 1963 Census of Manufactures summaries could not
be retrieved in machine—readable form. Luckily, most of the original R&D
schedules could still be found, though they had to be repunched from scratch.—4—
Thus, what started out as a simple update, became an almost entirely new
data gathering and matching effort, of significantly larger dimension than
originally anticipated. Its basic objective was to create a matched body:
of data on most of the large R&D performing corporation in the U.S., making
it possible to analyze both the determinants and the consequences of R&D
spending over time. For this purpose a time series record has been created
for each company consisting of the major variables in the annual R&D survey
for each of the years 1957—1977, supplementary R&D information for selected
years (1962, 1967, 1972, and 1975), data from the Enterprise Statistics
(NCK—l) for 1967, 1972, and 1977, and a few additional items from the Census
of Manufactures establishment record summaries for 1967 and 1972.
The universe of this data match consists of all "certainty" cases in the
1972 R&D survey. I.e., the basic definition is the population of companies as
they existed in 1972 (as against 1962 in the earlier study) and the requirement
of "certainty" assures that the Census Bureau tried to collect consistent data
for these firms for more than one year. The "certainty" cases correspond
closely to the earlier restriction to companies with 1000 or more employees,
though it is a bit more inclusive. There were approximately 1100 such companies
in 1972. A "complete" record, however, exists only for a much smaller number of
companies. A number of different matching efforts were involved: First, a
company's R&D schedules had to be matched over time. A company, however, may
not have existed over the whole period as an independent entity, or was not
in the R&D Survey in some of the years. Second, separate matches had to be
made to the Enterprise Statistics (NCK—l) and Census of Manufactures summaries
in 1967, 1972, and 1977. Each of these matches could fail individually, both—5—
because the relevant records may not have been found, and because the defini-
tions of a company on the different surveys may have been inconsistent (due
to different rules of consolidation, treatment of foreign operations, etc.).
Given our interest in the analysis of productivity growth, our data can
be reclassified into: 1. Output measures (sales annually from HRD, value
added from Census of Manufactures for 1967, 1972, and 1977); 2. Employment
mreasures (total employment annually from HRD, manufacturing employment from
the Census in Census years); 3. Capital data (from Enterprise Statistics for
Census years); and 4. R&D data (annually from HRD, with additional mix detail
for 1962, 1967, 1972, and 1975). We have also added to the record price in—
dexes for the delfation of sales and value added, at the 2 1/2 digit NSF
recode detail (given in Table 1), derived from the BEA and BLS price indexes
tapes by 4—digit and input—output detail, an R&D deflator based on the method-
ology suggested by S. Jaffe (NSF 1972 and Griliches 1984), and investment
and capital stock deflators derived from various N]IPA publications.1
Table 1 gives detail on the industrial composition of the panel and also
some indication of the relative success of the various matching criteria.
Roughly speaking, if one requires a good match for at least two Census years,
the effective sample size is down to about 500 companies, though for a variety
of cross sectional questions significantly larger sample sizes are feasible.
Table 2 lists the number of firms with good R&D data by individual year,
showing both the growth of the R&D collection effort over time and sample
attrition in recent years due to merger activity and sample redefinition.
Table 3 lists the means and variances for the major variables as of 1972. But
before we look at these number in some detail I need to describe the model and—6—
the analytical framework that will be used for their analysis. This is the
topic of the next section.
III. The Analytical and Econometric Framework2
The work reported here focuses primarily on the analysis of productivity
growth for these companies, using a rather simple growth accounting approaëh




where Q is output (sales, or value added), C and L are measures of
capital and labor input, respectively, T is the current level of (average)
technological accomplishment (total factor productivity), K is a measure
of the accumulated and still productive (social or private) research capital
("knowledge"), 0 represents other forces affecting productivity, Rt measures
the real gross investment in research in period t, and the wi's connect the
levels of past research to the current state of knowledge.
For estimation purposes, the F and G functions are usually special-
ized to the Cobb—Douglas form and 0 is approximated by an exponential trend.
The whole model then is simplifies to
(4) =AeXtKtCtLl—7—
where A is constant, Aisthe rate of disembodied ttexternal?t technical
change, and constant returns to scale have been assumed with respect to the
conventional inputs (C and L). Alternatively, if one differentiates the
above expression with respect to time and assumes that conventional inputs
are paid their marginal products, one can reqrite it as
(5) f =q—c—(l—)l=X+ ck
wheref is the rate of growth of total factor productivity, lower—case
letters represent relative rates of growth of their respective upper—case
counterparts [x =C/X=(dXldt)/X].Equation (5) is a constrained version
of (4), with ,(theobserved factor share of capital) used to estimate the
true
A number of serious difficulties. arise when one turns to the operational
construction of the various variables (see Griliches 1979 for more detailed
discussion). Perhaps the two most important problems are the measurement of
output (Q)ina research—intensive industry (where quality changes may be
rampant), and the construction to the unobservable research capital measure (K).
Postponing the first for later consideration, we note that K =
cnbe thought of as a measure of the distributed lag effect of past research
investments on productivity.There are at least three forces at work here:
the lag between investment in research and the actual invention of a new tech-
nique or product, the lag between invention and the development and complete
market acceptance of the new technique or product, and the disappearance of the
technique or product from the currently utilized stock of knowledge due to—8—
changes in external circumstances and the development of superior techniques
or products by competitors (depreciation and obsolescence). There is some
scattered evidence, based largely on questionnaire studies that such lags are
rather short in industry, where most of research expenditures are spent on
development and applied topics, and where the private returns from R&D become
obsolete much fasher due to the erosion of a firmts specific monopoly posi-
tion (Pakes and Schankerman 1984).
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many studies have opted for an alternative version of equation (5), utilizing




allowing one to rewrite (5)as
(5') f= A+ ak=
where p is the rate of return to research expenditures (the marginal product
of K) while is the net investment in research as a ratio to total out-
put. In practice, to make some connection between gross and net investment in
research one needs information about its "depreciation" which, if available,
would have allowed one to construct a measure of K in the first place. Note
that in estimating (5) or (5') one assumes that either a or p are constant—9—
espectively across firms or industries. It is not clear, a priori, which
is the better assumption.
While our models are written as if the main point of research expenditures
is to increase the physical productivity of the firm's production process, most
of the actual research in industry is devoted to the development of new products
or processes to be sold and used outside the firm in question. Assuming that,
on average, the outside world pays for these products what they are worth to
it, using sales or value added as the dependent variable does in fact capture
the private returns to such research endeavours. However, the observed private
returns may underestimate the social returns because, given the competitive
structure of the particular industry, the market price of the new product or
process will be significantly below what consumers might have been willing to
pay for it. On the other hand, part of the increase in sales of an individual
firms may come at the expense of other firms and not as the result of the
expansion of the market as a whole. Also, some of the increase in prices
paid for a particular new product may come from changes in the market power
of a particular firm induced by the success of its research program. More-
over, some of the gains inproductivity or in the sales of new products may
be based on the research results of other firms in the same or some other in-
dustry. Such factors could result in the observed private returns overesti-
mating the social returns significantly. I will not be able to say much about
the net impact of such forces on the basis of the data at hand. This would
require a detailed comparison of the individual firm results with estimates
based on industry and economy wide returns to research, a topic beyond the
scope of this project. But since expected private returns are a determinant
of private investment flows into this acticity, this work is of some interest—10—
even if it cannot answer the social returns question unequivocally.
One can also use this framework to ask whether different types of R&D
(private versus federal, or basic versus applied) are equally "potent" in
generating productivity growth. One way of answering this question is to look
at the "mix" of R&D expenditures and ask if it matters for the question at
hand. Let there be two types of R&D expenditures, R1 and R2 ,andlet
us assume that the overall analysis is in terms of the logarithm of total
R&D expenditurs but that we believe that R2 should have been weighted more,




is the "share" of R2 in total R =R1+R2.Then the c logR*
term can be approximated by c Log R* log R + cs.The sign and signif i—
cance of the "mix" term s, will give us some clue about the size and
magnitude of the 5 term.
A similar argument can be made also in the context of a growth—rate
formulation. Let lower case letters denote growth rates. Then
r =(l—s)r1+ Sr2while r* =(l—s)r1+(l+)sr2
.If,as is mostly the
case in our data, the growth rates of r1 and r2 are roughly equal, then
r* =r(l+s),and again, the coefficient of the "mix" term s provides us
with some information about the "premium" or "discount" on R2 sincecr
can be approximated by
(7) cr*(a+Ss)r + (aFS)s—1].—
Given the pecularities of ou. data set ——itsunbalanced nature (many
missing observations towards the beginning and end of the period) the avail-
ability of capital and value added only for Census years, the desire to
preserve comparability with the earlier study, and the difficulty of doing
elaborate programming inside the Census Bureau, I focus primarily on two major
dimensions of the data: levels (in 1967, 1972, and 1977) and growth rates,
and eschew any attempt at a complete annual data analysis. The annual data
are summarized by computing average growth rates for two subperiods 1957—65
(corresponding to the earlier study period) and 1966-77, based on regressions
of the logarithms of the relevant variables on time trends (solving thereby
the missing years problem within each of these subperiods).
In implementing such a framework of analysis one has to deal with several
serious data problems: missing data, erroneous data and possible erroneous
matches, and mergers. Except for R&D data, no special effort was made to
replace missing values by various imputation procedures. It was our notion
that the basic data set represents what the Census did collect, what we
actually know, and that any imputation procedure should be done only in the
context of a particular research project where its implications for the final
analysis could be interpreted. As far as the R&D data are concerned, the
Census used the shuttle nature of the original questionnaires to fill in many
of the original blanks. To the extent that there remain missing values which
are not due to the fact that the whole company is missing before or after some
date, they were interpolated on the basis of the estimated growth rates (which
require at least f;ie good data points within each sub—period). For other
variables, missing values were not imputed It was not possible, within the
constraints of this project, to develop optimal imputation procedures.This
would have required several repeated passes at the original numbers.Instead,—12—
the analysis is based either on reduced "clean" samples or on "pairwise
present" correlation coefficient matrices.
From an econometric point of view, we have eo deal with the problem of
firm effects (or firm specific left—out variables) and the possibility that
the relationships we are trying to estimate may not stay constant either
across firms or across time. The first is handled by analyzing first differ-
ences or growth rates, transformations that eliminate any unchanging effects
from the model. The second problem, the problem of differences across firms,
is handled in part by calculating a measure of "partial" productivity growth
[BPT =y—(1—)], usingindividual firm data on the share of labor in
total costs. One can also estimate separate and different parameters for
the various industry groupings and include some of the other variables avail—
alie in the record which might distinguish one firm's environment and response
pattern from another's (such as its specialization ratio, size, or vertical
integration). The main hypothesis under investigation, that the returns to
R&D investments may have declined over time, is tested both by comparing
estimates based on the more recent data with the earlier results, and by
allowing and testing for systematic changes in the estimated relationships
between the three available cross—sections.
IV. Major Results
Before I present some of the preliminary results derived from this data
base it may be useful to review both its structure and the main outlines of
what happened in the 1970's. Table 3 is intended to describe three aspects
of these data: 1. The general characteristics (means and standard deviations)—13—
of the sample as of 1972; 2. average rates of growth of the major variables
of interest during the 1967—77 period; and 3. how these measures change when
the sample is chngd to select observations according to the availability of
the requisite information.
Turning to the last topic first, note that we tend to lose smaller and
more R&D intensive firms as the sample gets more restrictive. Matrix 1 corres-
ponds to the most liberal ctiterion: a firm had to exist in 1972 and report
positive R&D to be included in this sample. Matrix 2 requires both the ability
to compute a growth rate for the 1967—77 period (i.e.
,atleast five good time
series observations) and a successful match to the 1972 Census of Enterprise
data (NCK—l). Matrix 3 adds to this also the requirement of a successful match
to the 1977 Census data while Matrix 4 asks for a match with the 1967 Census
instead of the 1977 one. Most of the difference occurs in the transition
from Matrix 1 to Matrix 2 where trying to match to the Census we lose a re-
latively large number of smaller firms for which there are still data on the
R&D Survey files.The. firms that can be also found in 1977 are slightly larger
and have had a somewhat higher rate of growth in employment, R&D, and produc-
tivity. The firms that also existed in 1967 are even larger but have on
average grown somewhat more slowly than those that exited only in the 1972—77
period. If we look at two of our major variables or interest, partial pro-
ductivity growth and the ratio of basic to total R&D, there is almost no
difference in their means across the relevant matrixes (2, 3, and 4) and hence
it is unlikely that subsequent conclusions will be subject to a serious sample
selection bias. I will, therefore, ignore this topic for the purposes of
further discussion here.
Looking at the levels of the variables in 1972 we see that the average—14—
firm in the sample is quite large with 5000+ employees: it employs close
to a hundred R&D scientists and engineers, and is making only a relatively
modest investment of its own money (about 2.5 percent of sales) in R&D, with
very little of that, less than 3 percent, being devoted to Basic R&D.3 This
picture is somewhat misleading, however. The actual distribution of firms
is quite skewed, with a small number of larger firms spending much larger
amounts on both total and basic R&D. Looking at growth rates one can
observe that on average these firms grew only moderately during this period:
about 1 percent per year in total employment, about 2.5 percent per year in
partial productivity, and almost zero growth in deflated R&D expenditures
(though a slightly positive rate of growth in the number of R&D scientists
and engineers). Here again, while on average there is little movement, there
is a great deal of variability at the individual firm level. The standard
deviations of the rates of growth of partial productivity and total R&D are
3.5 and 8 percent per annum respectively, with many firms growing much faster
(and also much slower) than the average.
Looking at some of the R&D ratios over time, not reported in Table 3,
one cannot see any significant decline in the rate of private investment in
R&D. While the total R&D to Sales ratio falls from .042 in 1962 to .035 in
1972 (in matrix 4) and again from .032 in 1972 to .029 in 1977 (matrix 3),
the CRS (company financed R&D to sales) ratios are essentially unchanged
(.025 in 1962 and 1972 in matrix 4 and .023 in 1972 and 1977 in matrix 3.)
On the other hand, while the BR ratio fell only modestly, from .033 to .031
between 1962 and 1972 (in matrix 4) and from .027 to .023 between 1972 and
1977 (in matrix 3), coupled with the decline in the overall total R&D to Sales
ratio this implies about a 40 percent reduction in the relative intensity of—15—
industrial investment in basic research, relative to industry sales. Almost
all of this decline came from the overall decline in federally financed R&D
which declined from about 55 percent of total R&D in industry in 1965 to
about 35 percent in 1982. The federal government financed about 32 percent of
all basic research in industry in 1967 but only 19 percent in 1982 (see NSF,
84—311). The reduction was so steep that basic research in industry declined
not only relative (to sales) but also absolutely, from a peak of $813 million
in 1966 (in 1977 dollars) to a trough of $581 million in 1975 and did not
surpass the 1960's levels until the early 80's. How one interprets the con-
sequences of such declines depends on one's view of the relative productivity
of governmentally financed R&D expenditures in industry, a topic I will be
exploring below.
Let us look now at the first set of substantive results. Table 4 reports
the results of estimating cross—sectional production functions (eq. 4) sepa-
rately for each Census year, adding to the standard capital and labor variables
a measure of total R&D capital accumulated by the firm and two R&D "mix"
variables: the fraction of total R&D that was spent on basic research and the
fraction of accumulated R&D which had been financed privately. All the reported
estimates allow for 18 to 20 (depending on the matrix) separate industry inter-
cepts. The first and last two columns report estimates which are based on the
same number of firms and use the same dependent variables, differing only by
the year of observation. The two middle columns present additional estimates
for 1972 based on different sample and dependent variable definitions with the
main intent being to show that the major conclusions are insensitive to such
differences. There are three major points to be made about these estimates:
1. The stock of R&D capital contributes significantly to the explanation of—16—
cross—sectional differences in productivity and there is little evidence of
a decline in its coefficient over time.3 There is a minor rise in the esti-
mated coefficient from 1967 to 1972 and a somewhat larger but not really
significant deddine from 1972 to 1977. Given this particular measure of R&D
capital, based on a 15 percent per year declining balance depreciation formula
(the results are insensitive to the particular formula used), the implied
average (at the geometric mean of the sample) gross rate of return to R&D
investment rises in a similar fashion from .51 in 1967 to .62 in 1972 (in
matrix 4) and falls from .39 in 1972 to .33 in 1977 (in matrix 3). In either
case the estimated rate of return is uite high and there does not appear to
be any dramatic fall in it over time.
The second major finding is the significance and rather large size of the
basic research coefficient. It seems to be the case that firms that spend a
larger fraction of their R&D on basic research are more productive, have a
higher level of output relative to their other measured inputs, including R&D
capital, and that this effect has been relatively constant over time. If any-
thing, it has risen rather than fallen over time. Using the formulation of
equation (6) in Section III implies a very high premium on basic versus the
rest, a 5 of between 2.5 to 4.5, a several hundred percent premium on
basic research. Before I explore the implications of this result, I want
to examine some other dimensions of these data and see whether similar effects
can be observed there too.
The last major result of interest is the significant positive coefficient
on the privately versus federally financed R&D mix variable. This variable is
of most import for the older more established firms in matrix 4, but its sign—17-
is consistent throughout, indicating a positive premium on privately financed
R&D, or equivalently a discount as far as federally financed expenditures are
concerned. Here the implied premium is smaller, between 50 and 180 percent,
but still quite large.
All the above results were based on cross—sectional level regressions
which are subject to a variety of biases, the main one being the possibility
that "rich" successful firms are both more productive and can afford to spend
more of their own money on such luxuries as P&D and especially the basic
variety. One can reduce somewhat the possibility of this type of bias by
focusing on firm growth rates, the changes that occurred, rather than on
their levels. To the extent that firms have idiosyncratic productivity co-
efficients which may be also correlated with their accumulated R&D levels,
considering growth rates is equivalent to doing a "within" firms analysis,
one that eliminates such "fixed effects" from the analysis. The next two
tables present, therefore, the results of analyzing the growth in the partial
productivity of these same firms during the whole 1966—77 period.
Table 5 presents the results of estimating partial productivity equations
in the largest possible sample (matrix 6) and in the sample with a successful
1972 Census match (matrix 2). Here again we find our three main results con-
firmed: the R&D growth term and the two mix variables: the basic research
ratio and the fraction of research financed privately all contribute signi-
ficantly to the explanation of productivity growth.
On the assumption that the growth rate in the stock of R&D is roughly
proportional to the growth in deflated R&D itself, the coefficient of BTRD
should be estimating the same number as the coefficient of the R&D stock
variable in Table 4.The results are in fact surprisingly close: about .12—18—
in Table 5 as against .09 to .17 in Table 4. Moreor, there seems to have
been no decline in this coefficient relative to the earlier 1957—65 period.
In the previous study (Griliches 1980) I estimated the same coefficient to
be .073. In the current replication and extension of this sample a similar
equation for 1957—65 yields a BTRD coefficient of .086.
Thus, if anything, the coefficient of R&D went up between the early 60's and
the early 70's.
The second major finding of interest is the positive and significant
basic research coefficient. It is hard to interpret its magnitude since the
approximation outlined in Section III breaks down when the average growth rate
of deflated R&D and of basic R&D is close to zero or negative. Consider,
however, the following illustrative calculation. Raising the BR ratio by one
standard deviation, from .026 to .097 at the mean, would increase the rate
of growth of partial productivity by close to half a percent per year
(.071 x .059 =.0042).This same increase would raise the growth of total R&D by
.107 for one year and would contribute a once and for all increase in the level
of productivity of .0125. Discounting the more "permanent" effect of basic re-
search by a real interest rate of .05 yields an "equivalent" one year effect
of .084, or a 7 to 1 ratio in favor of basic research! If one allows for
industry dummies which in this formulation represent separate industry trends
of disembodied technical change, the effect of basic research is cut by about
50 percent, implying perhaps that a significant fraction of the estimated
effect comes from spillovers which diffuse throughout the industry. Note that
it is the only coefficient that is affected substantively when separate industry
dummies are allowed for. Nevertheless, even a 3.2 to 1 ratio is quite high!—19—
The third finding is the significant positive premium on company financed
R&D. Here too the impled premia are quite high, but given that the mix variable
is defined in terms of stocks rather than flows the calculations are more cum-
bersome. Consider starting from a zero growth position and a .7 ratio of
private to total R&D stock. To move this fraction from .7 to .75 we would
need to raise the private stock by 29 percent and the overall stock by 20 per-
cent (without reducing absolutely the stock of federally financed R&D capital).
There are different possible investment paths that would achieve this goal and
would have somewhat different present value consequences. If one roughly
doubled the rate of privately financed R&D expenditures, from the previous
replacement level of .105 (.7 x .15) to .205, one could achieve this target
in slightly over two years. Ignoring discounting, this would lead to a once
and for all growth in productivity of .024, due to the growth in the total
stock of R&D and a .0011 permanent increase in the rate of growth due to the
shift of the fraction private ratio from .7 to .75. The present value of this
second term is about.022, or of the same order of magnitude as the first term.
That is, raising the stock of R&D by 20 percent but shifting it all into the
private component doubles the effect of such dollars.
There are problems, however, with such an interpretation. If private R&D
expenditures contribute more to productivity growth, one might have thought
that when they are substituted for the total R&D growth measure they might fit
better and also have a higher coefficient. But that is not the case as can be
seen from the results presented in columns 2 and 5 of Table 4. The total R&D
measure does a little bit better both in terms of fit and in the overall size
of its coefficient, implying that the contribution of federal dollars is not—20—
zero. That is perhaps what one should expect. Most of the direct outputof
federal research dollars is "sold" back to the government at "cost plus"
and is unlikely to show up as an increase in the firm's own productivity. Thus
all that one could expect to measure here are the within firm spillover effects
of such expenditures. What we may be detecting is that such effects are indeed
present and positive but we should not have expected them tobe of the same
order of magnitude as would be the case for the firm's own investments in im-
proving its productivity or profitability.
There are a number of eocnometric questions that can be raised about the
robustness and sensitivity of such results. I will discuss only a few of
these here. The most obvious question arises from the fact that even though
I allowed, in the growth rates version, for separate firm intercepts anddif-
ferent industry trends, I am still assuming common R&D and conventional capital
coefficients across rather different industries. This is done from necessity
rather than as a virtue. Estimating the same models industry by industry
reduces the sample sizes drastically and raises greatly the relative noise
level, making it rather hard to interpret the resulting estimates.Neverthe-
less, these estimates, which are summarized in Table 6, are quiteconsistent
with the earlier story: 17 out of the separately estimated 19 coefficients
for the R&D growth variable are positive and more than half of them are
statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Similarly,
the coefficients of the basic research ratio variable are positive in 14
of our 19 industries and significant in over a third of them.The
fraction private variable is less robust to the division of the sample
into industries, with more than half of the coefficients still positive,
but only four of them are statistically significant within particular—21-
industries. Twoofthese industries are indeed the ones where one would
expect to find such an effect, aircraft and electronics, industries where the
bulk of federal monies is spent. Nevertheless, it seems that the effect that
is being caught by the fraction private variable has an important industry
component, something that had been already noted in the earlier study
(Griliches 1980), as does also the effect associated with the basic research
variable, though to a lesser extent.
A number of other versions were computed using the growth in capital
services rather than the depreciation and age composition variables which had
been used to keep the results comparable to the earlier study, and the growth
in R&D "capital" rather than the flow (and also different definitions of such
"capital"). I also estimated versions using the "intensity" form for the R&D
variable, to make it more comparable to other studies in the literature
(Griliches—Lichetenberg 1984, Mansfield 1980, and others). By and large the
results of these alternatives were somewhat weaker but not substantively dif-
ferent. Perhaps the most interesting alternative estimate is the intensity
version using the growth of capital between 1967 and 72 as its capital measure:
BPT6677 =... .243ACRS+.045ABR+.18ODLCS See =.0316
(.069) (.024) (.130) (Matrix 4)
where ACRS is the average company R&D to sales ratio, averaged over 1967 and
1972. ABR is a similar average basic to total R&D ratio, and DLCS is the rate
of growth in deflated capital services between 1967 and 1972. This version is
closest in form to the kind of equations estimated by Mansfield (1980) on much
smaller samples. The basic results are similar, however. Basic R&D is a
significant contributor to productivity growth with an implied basic to company—22—
premium of about 5 to 1 (given an average R&D to sales ratio of .035).
The final set of results to be presented here, in Table 7, relate to the
relative profitability of our firms in 1972 and 1977. The dependent variable,
GRR, is the ratio of gross profits (value added minus labor costs and plus
R&D) to total gross fixed assets. The independent variables include the ratio
of R&D capital (undepreciated) to total fixed assets and our ubiquitous R&D
mix variables: the basic research and fraction private ratios. Even though
the dependent variable is quite different the overall results are rather
similar to the earlier ones. The R&D capital variable is positive and almost
always statistically significant though its coefficient is a bit low if it is
to be interpreted as a rate of return to it. The basic research variable is
both large and significant though possibly too large to be credible. Given that
the ratio of total R&D capital to total fixed assets is only about .05 on average
in 1972 the estimated coefficients imply a of about 30 to 60. The frac-
tion private ratio also contributes positively to profitability but its effect
largely disappears once industry differences are allowed for. The results for
1977 are weaker than those for 1972, the residual variance is significantly
higher, but they too suggest the importance of basic research even in this
context. A similar analysis was performed using an estimate of the net rate
of return as the dependent variable, subtracting depreciation from the numera-
tor of GRR and using a net stock concept for the denominator and also in the
definition of the R&D capital variable. While the fit was significantly worse
when using this definition of the dependent variable, the overall results were
rather similar. The net return version was also available for 1967 and the
results using it indicate a relatively constant and significant coefficient
for the basic research ratio while the coefficient of the total R&D stock rises—23—
from 1967 to 1972 and than falls again in 1977 (from .11 to .16 and down
to .06). It is doubtful whether these fluctuations represent real trends or,
more likely, reflect the larger noise level in the 1977 data and the changing
composition of these samples. In any case, the profitability regressions
are consistent with the productivity level and productivity growth rate
based results described earlier (Tables 4, 5, and 6).
V. Discussion and Summary
The three major findings of this paper: that R&D contributed positively
to productivity growth and seems to have earned a relatively high rate of
return, that basic research appears to be more important as a productivity
determinant than other types of R&D, and that privately financed R&D expendi-
tures are more effective, at the firm level, than federally financed ones,
are not entirely new or very surprising. The first finding has been documented
in a number of earlier studies (see Griliches 1980, Griliches and Mairesse
1984, Link l98la, and others). What is new in this paper in this regard is
a confirmation of this finding on a much larger and more recent data set. It
also presents evidence for the view that this effect has not declined signi-
ficantly in recent years, in spite of the overall slowdown in productivity
growth and the general worry about a possible exhaustion of technological
opportunities.
The evidence for a t7premium't on basic research is much more scarce. The
major previous paper suggesting this type of a result is Mansfield (1980)
which uses aggregate data for 20 industries for 1948—66 and data for 16 firms
during 1960—76 and finds a significant premium on basic research, on the order—24—
of 2 to 1 at the industry level and 16 to 1 at the firmlevel.(See also
Link 1981b for similar results for 1973—78 based on data for 55 firms.) In
this paper I get similar though somewhat smaller effects at the firm level,
using a much larger and more representative sample. I also find that differ-
ences in levels of productivity and profitability are related to differences
in the basic research intensity of firms.
Such findings are always subject to a variety of econometric and sub—
stantive reservations. In this context the two major related issues are
simultaneity and the question how can major divergences in private rates of
return persist for such long periods. It is possible to argue that it is
not R&D, or its basic research component, the casues firm "success" as measured
by productivity and profitability but rather that success allows firms to
indulge in these types of luxury pursuits. It is difficult to argue about
causality on the basis of what are essentially correlational data. It is
possible to use simultaneous equation techniques to estimate such models but
then the argument shifts to the validty of the exogeneity assumption for the
particular instruments. In the context of our specific data set it is hard to
think of any valid instruments except for possibly lagged values of the same
variables, which raises some problems of its own. The best evidence for the
notion that these results are not entirely spurious is provided by the growth
rates where the individual firm levels are partialed out of the analysis. But,
here too, one could argue about the impact of common unanticipated "luck"
elements. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that one could use lagged growth rates
as instruments since there is very little correlation in growth rates over time
at the firm level. While an attempt will be made in further work with these
data to estimate more extended simultaneous equations versions of such models,—25—
I am not too optimistic as to what can be accomplished in this regard. The
evidence presented here should not be interpreted as "proving" that R&D, and
expecially its basic component, are important for productivity growth but
rather as presenting some prima facia evidence in support of such an inter-
pretation. In this sense it is an exercise in economic rhetoric (McCloskey
1983).
It is even more difficult to respond to the theoretical a priori argument
that such results cannot be true since they imply widely differing rates of
return to different activities under the control of the same firms. One's
response to this depends on one's views as to the prevalence of equilibria in
the economy. While it is likely that major divergences in rates of return are
eliminated or reduced in the long run, the relevant runs can be quite long.
R&D as a major component of firm activity was undergoing a diffusion process
in the 1950's and 1960's and may not have reached full equilibrium even by the
end of our period. This may be especially true of the basic research component
where the risks are much greater and the uncertainty introduced by changing
government policies and the changing economic environment make it quite diff i—
cult to decide what is the right level for it.
A somewhat different version of this argument would claim that the world
is indeed in approximate equilibrium but that different firms face different
opportunities for doing research, basic or otherwise, are in different ecologi-
cal niches, and hence have different coefficients in their "production
functions." This would explain why different firms are observed to spend
different amounts on R&D while actually earning about the same rate of return
on it. When a constant coefficients production function is fit to such data
it will fit because it is approximating a market equilibrium relation. If the—26—
level of R&D invested were independent of the coefficient then such a
function would just reproduce its average share and not produce any evidence
of excess returns. But if, as is reasonable, R&D is invested optimally with
firms which have better opportunities, higher coefficients, investing more,
this will induce a positive correlation between R&D and its individual co-
efficient and lead to an upward bias in the estimated "average" coefficient.4
The resulting "larger" coefficient, larger than the observed factor share,
will be interpreted, wrongly, as implying a higher rate of return than is
actually prevailing at the individual level.
This argument may be recognized as a version of the earlier attacks on
the Cobb—Douglas production function combined with a random coefficients
interpretation of the same phenomenon. In its extreme form it is testable.
Since there are time series data available for individual firms one could try
to estimate individual firm parameters and check whether they are in fact
distributed as is predicted by this particular argument. While individual
parameters are unlikely to be well estimated, given the relative shortness of
the available times series, the parameters of the distribution of such coef-
ficients might be estimable with more precision. I intend to pursue this
possibility in further work.
To restate again the major points of the paper: A newly available body
of data on all the major R&D doing firms in the U.S. has been examined and
evidence has been presented for the proposition that R&D contributes signifi-
cantly to productivity growth, that the basic research component of it does
so even more strongly, and that privately financed R&D expenditures have a
significantly larger effect on private productivity and profitability than—27--
federally financed R&D. These findings are open to a number of reservations.
Nevertheless, they do raise the issue that the overall slowdown in the growth
of R&D and the absolute decline in basic research in industry which occurred
in the 1970's may turn Out to have been very costly to the economy in terms
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1977 801Table 3: Major Variables in 1972 and 1966—77 Growth
Rates by Subsample. Means and Standard
Deviations (in parentheses)*
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Geometric means and standard deviations of the logarithms (approximate coefficient
of variation) except for growth rates or ratios.Table 4: NSF—Census Study: Cross—Sectional Production Functions
Log Value Added Dependent,1 U.S. Firms, 1967, 1972
and 1977. Coefficients (standard errors)
Variables
1967 1972 1972 19722 1972 19772
L. Empl (nr) .604 .622 .623 .586 .578 .611
(.045) (.046) (.035) (.038) (.038) (.039)
L Capit. Serv. .224 .199 .161 .234 .254 .291
(.041) (.044) (.032) (.036) (.036) (.035)
L T R&D Stk. (db) .113 .135 .165 .126 .115 .089
(.023) (.026) (.019) (.019) (.018) (.017)
B/R .396 .340 .274 .499 .517 .401
(.240) (.261) (.215) (.191) (.189) (.189)
FP .190 .247 .068 .133 .138 .044
(.097) (.106) (.100) (.088) (.088) (.084)
N 386 386 652 491 491 491
SEE .312 .336 .390 .312 .309 .290
1Value added and materials used in research in 1967 and 1972.
2Value added only.
I Employment —log(total employment——employment of scientists and engineers)
L Capit. Serv. —logof (depreciation plus interest on net assets plus machin-
ery and equipment rentals)
I T R&D (db) —logof the "stock" of total R&D expenditures based on a 15 per-
cent per year declining balance depreciation assumption.
B/R —basicresearch as a fraction of total R&D. 1972 in the 1977 equation,
1967 in 1967 and 1972.
FP —fractionof R&D stock "private", company financed R&D stock as a ratio
to the total R&D stock, as of t.
All equations include also a constant term and industry dummies. The number of
industry dummies used depends on matrix. In 1967—72, Matrix 4, 18 industries.
In 1977, Matrix 3, 19 industries.Table 5: Growth Rate of Partial Productivity, 1966—77
Different Estimates
Matrix 6 Matrix 2
Variables N911 N=652
Const. .019 .009 .012 with industry dunmiles




BR 72 .056 .056 .059 .035 .034
(.017)(.017) (.019)(.018)(.018)
FP 72 .011 .019 .017 .022 .030
(.005)(.005) (.006)(.007)(.007)
SEE .0383 .0384 .0337 .0305 .0307
Dep. variable: BPT 6677 =trendgrowth rate of deflated sales minusthe
trend growth of total employment multiplied by the share
of payroll in total sales.
BTRD—trendgrowth of deflated total R&D expenditures
BCRD —samefor company financed R&D expenditures
B/R—basicresearch expenditures as of fraction of total research expenditures.
FP—ratioof company financed R&D stock to total.
SEE —residualstandard error.
Allequations contain also a term reflecting the variance of R&D and terms
representing the growth of physical capital: age composition and depreciation
asof 1972.Table 6: Growth Rate of Partial Productivity,
by industry, 1966—77. Matrix 6, Total N =991
Coefficients
of Coefficients by the estimated t—ratio
<—1.5—1.5—00—1.5 1.5+
BTRD 2 7 lO:Misc, md. Chem,Drugs,
St. & Gi., Mach., Electron.,
Elect. Eq., Transp. Eq.,
Sc. Inst., Non Mfg.
BR72 5 8 6:Wood & P, 0th. Chem, Oil,
Mach., Aircraft, Non Mfg.
FP72 2 6 7 4:Oil, Rubber, Electron.,
Aircraft
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b regressions contain industry dummies.FOOTNOTES
*
HarvardUniversity and the NBER. I am indebted to NSF grant No. SES82—08006
for the support of this work, to Doug Dobos and Bronwyn H. Hall for making
the data gathering effort possible and to David Body for research assistance.
I have also benefited from comments of seminar participants at the NBER and
Yale.
1. See Griliches—Hall, 1982, and Hall 1984 for more details.
2. This section borrows heavily from Griliches 1974.
3. Here and subsequently, all statements about statistical "significance"
should not be taken literally. Besides the usual issue of data mining clouding
their interpretation, the "samples" analyzed come close to covering completely
the relevant population. Tests of significance are used here as a metric for
discussing the relative fit of different versions of the model. In each case,
the actual magnitude of the estimated coefficients is of more interest than
their precise "statistical significance."
4. A positive correlation is not enough, but itself, for a positive bias.
The weight of an individual firm slope coefficient in the cross—sectional
estimate is proportional to the square of the deviation of R&D stock from
its mean. A positive correlation between levels does not translate itself
directly into a positive correlation between the level of one variable and
the square of the other, except for certain skewed distributions. Since we
do not observe the individual coefficients directly, it is rather difficult
to check out this conjecture.References
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